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ESTATE TAX-The Failure of I.R.C. Section 2039 
To Reach Death Benefits Arising Out of the 
Employment Relationship-Estate of Fusz* 
577 
Decedent's employment contract provided for a salary payable 
to him and monthly payments to his widow for life if he died during 
the term of the contract. No post-retirement benefits were payable 
to decedent under the contract or pursuant to any other agreement 
• 46 T.C. 214 (1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
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with the employer. After decedent's death during the term of the 
contract the payments to his widow commenced; their commuted 
value, however, was not included in the gross estate of decedent. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ruling that the payments 
to the widow constituted an annuity, the commuted value of which 
was includable in decendent's gross estate under section 2039 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 assessed a deficiency in decedent's 
estate tax return. In a case of first impression, the Tax Court re-
jected the Commissioner's contention.2 The payments to decedent's 
widow are not includable in decedent's gross estate because before 
his death decedent had no right to receive an annuity or other pay-
ment under the employment contract. 
Section 2039 is designed to sweep into the net of the estate tax 
certain annuities and death benefits payable to beneficiaries by vir-
tue of the terms of a decedent's employment contract.3 Includability 
of such payments in the decedent's gross estate depends upon the 
satisfaction of two conditions: the beneficiary's right to the pay-
ments must arise by reason of surviving the decedent, and the de-
cedent, at the time of his death, must either have been receiving or 
have had a right to receive an "annuity or other payment" under 
the terms of the employment contract. It is the latter requirement 
which is the source of the controversy in the principal case, since the 
meaning of the words "annuity or other payment" as used in section 
2039 is by no means clear.4 The Commissioner seized upon this 
vagueness and argued that the decedent's salary was an "other pay-
ment" within the meaning of the statute so that the payments to 
the beneficiary were properly includable. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the court held that "the phrase 'other payment' is qualitatively 
limited to post-employment benefits which, at the very least, are 
I. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(a) provides: 
SEC. 2039. ANNUITIES. (a) GENERAL.-The gross estate shall include the value of 
an annuity or other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving 
the decedent under any form of contract or agreement entered into after March 3, 
1931 (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent), if, under 
such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the de• 
cedent, or_ the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment, 
either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period not 
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in 
fact end before his death. 
2. The Tax Court's decision was reviewed by the full court. 
3. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 123 (1954). 
4. In connection with ,both decedent and beneficiary, "annuity or other payment" 
refers to one or more payments extending over any period of time; such payments may 
be "equal or unequal, conditional or unconditional, periodic or sporadic." Treas. Reg. 
§ 20.2039-l(b)(l)(ii) (1958). The phrase is meant to cover a lump sum payment to 
decedent, whether in lieu of an annuity or not. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 470 
(1954). Similarly, it is immaterial whether payments to the beneficiary are in the form 
of a lump sum, installments, or are for an amount different from those payable to the 
decedent. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A315 (1954). As to the distinction be• 
tween annuities and life insurance payments, see Treas. Reg.§ 20.2039-l(d) (1958). 
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paid or payable during decedent's lifetime."5 Although this holding 
may be a correct construction of the unclear statutory language, it 
has effectively insulated from estate taxation death benefit arrange-
ments which ought properly to be reached. 
To illustrate the tax avoidance potential of the holding of the 
principal case, suppose that an employee, like decedent in the prin-
cipal case, owns one-third of the stock of the corporation by which 
he is employed as one of its officers. His employment contract pro-
vides for salary payable to him during his employment and death 
benefits to his wife upon his death. At the normal retirement age, 
he resigns his position and becomes a member of the board of direc-
tors of the corporation under a contract pursuant to which he re-
ceives a reduced, but still adequate, compensation and his wife 
remains entitled to the death benefits. This arrangement continues 
until his death, and his widow thereafter would, under the holding 
of the court in the principal case, take her payments free of all estate 
taxes6 since at no time did the decedent ever receive, nor was he 
eligible to receive-since, after all, he never had retired-any post-
retirement annuity or other payment. Surely the number of em-
ployees in a position to take advantage of this windfall cannot be 
inconsiderable, particularly when one includes employees whose re-
tirement comfort is assured by arrangements for income from other 
sources and whose sole bargaining concern would thus be to insure 
an income for their widows. 
Although the court may have been justified in concluding that 
the mere payment of salary to an employee does not require the 
inclusion in the employee's estate of death benefits made to his 
widow, at least one of the reasons articulated by the court seems 
5. Principal case at 218. 
6. The Commissioner expressly disclaimed includability under any other section 
of the estate tax portion of the Code, and his disclaimer seems well founded. Section 
2033, which taxes property in which decedent had an interest at his death, seems to 
require that the decedent have "enforceable vested rights" to the property. Pincus, 
Estate Taxation of Annuities and Other Payments, 44 VA. L. REv. 857, 867 (1958). Such 
rights are clearly absent in the principal case. 
Can the arrangement in the principal case be considered a revocable transfer, and 
thus taxable under § 2038? To so hold requires (1) that there be an inter vivos transfer 
by decedent and (2) that decedent, during his life, have a power to revoke or alter the 
benefits payable to the beneficiary, or the power to change beneficiaries. There is a line 
of cases decided under the 1939 Code, e.g., Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 
(D. Mass. 1961); Paul G. Leoni, 1948 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ~ 48213, which considered 
contracts similar to the one in the principal c;µ;e and found a "transfer" of property 
from the employee to the beneficiary in the fact of continued employment under the 
contract which established the death benefits, but another line of cases also decided 
under the 1939 code, e.g., Estate of Davis, 27 T.C. 378 (1956), seemed to find a power to 
alter or revoke only when such a power is expressly granted in the employment contract. 
Thus, unless the employer and employee in fact understood that the employee had the 
right to alter or revoke, or unless the employee's position in the company clearly 
indicated that he had such power, it would seem that the arrangement in the principal 
case is not within the scope of § 2038. 
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totally inapposite. The court noted that the Treasury Regulations7 
provide that when decedent has received everything to which he is 
entitled under the contract or agreement, subsequent payments to 
his beneficiary will not be includable in the decedent's gross estate; 
conversely, when the decedent dies with payments under the con-
tract still owing, the payments to his beneficiary are includable. The 
court stated that if the Commissioner's construction were read in 
the light of this regulation, then if the employee dies in the middle 
of his pay period, with salary owing, the payments to his beneficiary 
would be included in his gross estate whereas if the employee should 
die at the beginning of his pay period, with no salary owed to him, 
the payments to the beneficiary would not be included-clearly an 
absurd result. In assessing the merit of this argument, it is necessary 
to keep in mind that the requirement of an annuity or other pay-
ment to decedent is satisfied if at the time of his death the decedent 
was in fact receiving payments, regardless of whether he had an 
enforceable right to them. 8 This would seem to cover the employee 
who dies at the beginning of his pay period, since he has in fact 
been receiving his salary payments as they have accrued under his 
employment contract. The only employees who would seemingly 
not be covered would be those whose contracts are conterminous 
with their pay period, typically a class of employees--such as day 
laborers-not usually the subject of death benefit contracts of the 
type under consideration. 
The court's second reason for rejecting the Commissioner's con-
struction, a much stronger, and indeed dispositive one, is that if 
"annuity or other payment" is read to include salary payments, then 
the phrase would encompass all payments and the words "annuity 
or other" would be nullities. Such a result would violate the rule of 
statutory construction that a statute should be read so as to give 
effect to all of its words.9 But this, it might be argued, is only a rule 
of construction which could be displaced by more compelling con-
siderations. Arguably, it was the intent of Congress to foreclose 
the kind of loophole mentioned above, by dealing with, once and 
for all, all annuity payments arising out of the employment relation. 
Consequently, given both the vagueness of the phrase "annuity or 
other payment" and the ambiguous legislative history of the sec-
tion, 10 the court may have been excessively reverent toward a mere 
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-l(b)(2), example (5) (1958). 
8. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2039-l(b)(2), example (2) (1958). 
9. See, e.g., MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 55 (1953). 
10. S. REP. No. 1662, supra note 3, at 470; H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 3, at 
A315, give the following example of an includable item: 
(4) A contract or agreement entered into by the decedent and his employer under 
which at decedent's death, prior to retirement or prior to the expiration of a 
stated period of time, an annuity or other payment was payable to a designated 
beneficiary if surviving the decedent. 
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rule of construction, to the point of foiling Congress' purpose in 
enacting the section.11 
In support of the court's holding, however, it should be pointed 
out that it is not completely clear that Congress intended to reach 
the type of death benefit arrangement present in the principal case. 
Indeed it appears that Congress was primarily concerned with 
self and survivor and joint and survivor post-retirement annuities, 
neither of which were present in the principal case.12 Two difficulties 
had frustrated attempts to reach these employment annuities before 
the enactment of section 2039:13 the absence, in many instances, of 
a "vested right" in the decedent to the funds payable to his bene-
ficiary;14 and the absence of a transfer of property from decedent to 
his beneficiary where the employer had created the benefits and 
named the beneficiary.111 Section 2039, as interpreted by the Treasury 
Regulations,16 quite clearly solves these two problems, but there 
Since there is no mention in the example of an annuity payable to decedent, a possible 
inference arises that salary is sufficient to require inclusion of the benefits in the 
decedent's gross estate. It has been suggested, however, that example (4) is ambiguous, 
that none of the examples in the Regulations includes salary payments, and that had 
Congress intended such a marked change in the estate tax law, it would have announced 
the change with greater firmness. Pincus, supra note 6, at 866-67. Bittker, in Estate and 
Gift Taxation Under the 1954 Code: The Principal Changes, 29 TuL. L. REv. 453, 
469-70 n.58 (1955), argues that example (4) is not reconcilable with the rest of the 
statute unless one construes the example so as to exclude salary payable to decedent as 
a basis for includability. See also Comment, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 619, 627 (1963) (example 
(4) must be read as requiring an annuity payable to decedent; otherwise, "annuity or 
other" would be nullities). But see LOWNDES&: KRAMER, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXES 
207 (2d ed. 1962) (suggesting that there is a slight chance that salary will be a sufficient 
basis for inclusion); Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 
1959 DuKE L.J. 341, 356 (it is unclear whether salary is meant to be a sufficient basis for 
includability). 
11. For a case construing another part of § 2039 with great liberality so as to be 
consistent with the presumed intent of Congress, see Commissioner v. Estate of Albright, 
356 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1966). 
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP, No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954): 
Under present law the value at the decedent's death of a joint and survivor annuity 
purchased by him is includible in his gross estate. It is not clear under existing 
law whether an annuity of that type purchased by the decedent's employer, or an 
annuity to which both the decedent and his employer made contribution is in-
cludible in the decedent's gross estate. 
The bill requires the inclusion of a joint and survivor annuity in the gross 
estate •••• 
This would seem to support the argument that by speaking solely of joint and survivor 
annuities, Congress contemplated that § 2039 would operate only where decedent had a 
right to an annuity of some sort. Salary payments, then, would not be a sufficient basis 
for includability. 
13. See Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DuKE 
L.J. 341. 
14. See, e.g., Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), afj'd on other 
grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938); Estate of M. Hadden Howell, 15 T.C. 224 (1950); 
Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950). 
15. See, e.g., Estate of William S. Miller, supra note 14; Estate of Eugene F. Saxton, 
12 T.C. 569 (1949). 
16. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-l(b)(2), example (2) (1958). 
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seems to be no reason to assume that Congress also meant to reach 
death benefits in which the decedent had no interest. Moreover, the 
form of the section itself, by including a requirement of some sort 
of payment to decedent, seems to belie such an intent. It would have 
been quite simple to reach death benefits paid to the beneficiary, for 
Congress merely had to omit any requirement of payments to de-
cedent, and, instead, frame the statute so that all annuities or death 
benefits arising out of an employment relationship would be includ-
able in decedent's gross estate. However, Congress opted for a stat-
ute which, if it reaches death benefits at all, does so only by tortuous 
indirection. Indeed, this was the reasoning of the court in Bahen's 
Estate v. United States,17 in which the court by dictum rejected the 
same contention as was made by the Commissioner in the principal 
case. Finally, most of the critical commentary has suggested that 
section 2039 must be construed so as to exclude death benefits in 
which the decedent's only interest arises from his having received 
salary owing to him.18 
It seems that the Tax Court in the principal case has correctly 
construed what may be an ill-conceived statute. The requirement of a 
post-retirement annuity or other payment payable to decedent, which 
leads to the loophole mentioned above, is irrelevant to the under-
lying purpose of the section. Death benefits payable to a widow are 
part of the employee's compensation, are transferred at his death, 
and therefore should be taxable to his estate. This irrelevant re-
quirement should be eliminated, and it must be done by legislative 
revision of section 2039 since it is evident from the result in the 
principal case that it cannot be eliminated by a construction of the 
section as it is presently phrased. 
17. 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962). 
18. See authorities cited note 6 supra. 
